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This paper studies the economic incentives and the institutional issues governing
the outcomes of a short-term climate change policy package guided by the United
Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Berlin Mandate initiatives.
Game theoretic tools and the global trade-environment interface are explored within a 26-
region, 13-commodity computable general equilibrium framework to characterize the
incentives of OECD regions to comply with a non-binding agreement in a carbon
abatement coalition.  The results showed that the achievement of such a coalition as well
as its expansion by means of self-financed schemes are possible if suitable trade
instruments are designed.
1.   Introduction
                                                       
* I thank Thomas Rutherford, Yongmin Chen, Mark Cronshaw, and Nicholas Flores for helpful comments
and useful discussions.1
Increased concern about the possibility of an irreversible global climate change has
resulted in several international initiatives that may ultimately lead to adoption of policies
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  The signing of the United Nations' Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the Berlin Declaration are major steps in this
direction.  In its fourth article, the FCCC calls upon Annex1
1 countries to take early
actions to stabilize their greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions to their 1990 levels by year
2000.  The Berlin Mandate, on the other hand, has included a number of proposals each
suggesting 10% to 20% reductions in Annex1's GHGs emissions from their 1990 levels by
year 2010.  Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether and how the policy recommendations
of these initiatives may be implemented.  Of central importance are two issues: First, will
Annex1 voluntarily comply with some non-binding agreement in a coalition to reduce
GHGs emissions?  And second, what institutional arrangements can be made that would
promote cooperation among countries to achieve the emissions-reduction objective?
Both the game theoretic and the empirical literature on global warming seem to fall
short of adequately answering these questions
2.  The former, by focusing on general
abstract contexts, fails to convey the complexity of the interactions and the heterogeneity
among the current international players in the game; unsurprisingly, then, its predictions of
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 Annex1 consists of OECD countries, Former Soviet Union and the East European countries.  For reasons
we explain latter, we treat Annex1 as if it is OECD only.
2 Examples of the game theoretic literature are Maler (1991), Barrett (1991,1994), Carraro and Siniscalo
(1993), and Sandler and Sargent (1995).  Most of the empirical literature on global warming has emerged
from numerical general equilibrium models e.g. Whalley and Wigle (1991), Manne and Richel (1992),
Perroni and Rutherford (1993), Piggott, Whalley and Wigle(1993), Larsen and Shah (1994), OECD
(1995), and Harrison and Rutherford (1997).2
the likely outcomes appear both vague and conflicting.
3  The latter, on the other hand, by
merely focusing on the design and the implementation issues, have neglected to question
the feasibility and the self-enforceability of the particular arrangement.  The studies by
Piggott et al (1993), and Harrison and Rutherford (1997), however, are exceptions in that
both of them have, in addition, attempted to accommodate somehow countries’
participation incentives.  Piggott et al (1993) have extended the regional preferences in
their numerical model to include benefits from slowing global warming, and thereby
characterize what they call “sub-global maximum consensus carbon-emissions reductions.”
Harrison and Rutherford (1997) have considered an OECD coalition arrangement in which
the welfare costs of abatement are equated across the members.  Nevertheless, neither the
maximum consensus cutbacks nor the burden sharing arrangements, by themselves, are
sufficient to ensure the self-enforceability needed to stabilize the arrangement outcomes.
The primary contribution of this paper is to empirically quantify and assess the
incentives of Annex1 countries to voluntarily comply with a non-binding agreement to
form a CO2-abatement coalition.  A multi-region, multi-commodity general equilibrium
framework is developed to numerically simulate the strategic interactions among member
countries in the different coalition structures and to compute payoffs.  We show that free
riding incentives are so pervasive that a self-enforcing coalition may not be supported as
an equilibrium outcome under the current institutional arrangements.
A potentially important dimension in the interplay between global environment and
trade issues which has not been fully explored in the current global warming literature is
                                                       
3 For example the global warming game in Maler (1991) is a Prisoner's dilemma, in Carraro and Siniscalo
(1993) is a supergame with possibly stable partial coalitions, and in Sandler and Sargent (1995) is a
coordination game in which both mutual defection and full cooperation are Nash equilibria.3
the role of trade measures as enforcement mechanisms.  Provided the public aspect of the
global environment action, countries would certainly have incentives to free ride unless
credible deterrents were designed. As a second contribution of this paper, we motivate and
explore a connected trade-environment construct to address the free riding problem and to
promote cooperation among the member countries in the abatement coalition.  We show
that the Annex1 coalition can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium if suitable
trade rewards and punishment instruments are designed.
Provided that a stable abatement coalition among the member countries can be
constructed, the third addition by the paper is to characterize and implement a simple self-
financed scheme for expanding such a coalition.  With such a scheme, we show that the
three largest non-OECD carbon emitters join the abatement coalition and no other region
stands to gain by joining it (i.e. the expanded coalition is also stable.)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, the analytical framework,
describes our computable general equilibrium model (CGE) and the calibration of the
carbon abatement benefit functions.  Section 3 provides a numerical assessment of welfare
costs, institutions, and quota allocation rules in a 25%-cutback OECD coalition. Section 4
analyses the equilibria of the one-shot abatement game.  Section 5 presents the repeated
CO2-game analysis and explores the trade interaction as an enforcement mechanism.
Section 6 analyses the expanded CO2-abatment coalition.  Section 7 provides concluding
remarks.
2.   The Analytical Framework
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2.1  General Setup
Consider a group of N countries contemplating an agreement to provide a
specified level of a pure public good (CO2-abatement) through multilateral negotiations.
Let Wr be the welfare index for the rth country.  Since the abatement is a pure public good
we assume Wr to have the special form:
r r r r r r W U C Y p q B A = + ( ( , , )) ( ) (1)
Where Cr is a private consumption composite, Br is region r’s abatement benefit function,




Where the  ass are net regional CO2-abatements over the no-agreement case(i.e. all  ass are
zeros in the status quo).
pr is the domestic price vector, q is the international price vector, and Yr is the net output
vector (GNP) defined by the transformation:
r r r Y Y p q a = ( , ; ) (3)
The functions Ur, Cr, Br, and Yr are assumed to be well-behaved; in particular, Yr
is non increasing in ar, and Br is non decreasing in A.
Provided that Wr is separable in Ur and Br, the regional abatement benefit functions
may be evaluated independently of the private good technology.  This is useful because the
welfare cost (i.e. the loss in private consumption) of any abatement policy can be assessed
with reasonable certainty given the observed regional production, consumption, and
bilateral trade flows. In contrast, due to the uncertainties surrounding the benefits side (see
Cline 1992, and Nordhaus 1993), it is extremely difficult to model the benefits from5
reducing global warming within the household choice set.  Having made these simplifying
assumptions, we may proceed to solve the household optimization problem and measure
the welfare costs implied by the given abatement policy.  Next, we may use any reasonable
exogenous estimates of the regional valuations to compute their total benefits from the
resulting global abatement effort.  The net regional gains from the given abatement policy
would then be obtained by combining their corresponding cost and benefit estimates.
Formally, let  r a be the abatement quota of region r under the agreement.
4
Complying with the agreement, the representative agent in each country, r, solves
r
r r r r
c
U C Y p q max ( ( , , )) (4)
s.t. r r r Y Y p q a = ( , ; )
  r r a a ‡
In a multi-regional equilibrium framework, the solution to such a problem is
characterized by the regional equilibrium price vector p
*
r, the regional equilibrium
allocations C
*
r and  Y
*
r ,  the regional shadow price vector associated with the CO2
constraint, and the equilibrium international price vector q
*, such that all domestic and
international markets clear and every representative agent maximizes utility on her budget
set.  Numerically, this multi-regional equilibrium problem is formulated and solved as a
CGE model using the GAMS/MPSGE software described in Rutherford (1995,1997).
2.2   An Overview of the CGE Model and its Implementation
                                                       
4 In the empirical construct only a subset of the N countries is contemplating to form the abatement
coalition.  In that case for the non colluding countries abatement is unrestricted and their benefits from
abatement are assumed to be zeros.6
The framework is a static multi-regional general equilibrium model of energy and
trade. The model is built on a comprehensive energy-economy dataset that accommodates
a consistent representation of energy markets in physical units as well as  detailed accounts
of regional production and bilateral trade flows.  For details on the data set and its
construction, see Rutherford and Babiker(1997).  The original data set cover 26 regions
and 13 sectors, yet for tractability of the later numerical game analyses,  the regions are
aggregated into 24.  Description of the specific regions and commodities included in the
model is provided on Table 1.
The sectors in the model have been chosen to identify as many carbon-intensive
sectors for which region-specific and industry-specific data can be obtained
5.  The energy
goods identified in the model include coal (COL),  gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU), refined oil
products (OIL) and electricity (ELE). This disaggregation is essential in order to
distinguish energy goods by carbon intensity and by the degree of substitutability. In
addition, the model features important carbon-intensive and energy-intensive industries
which are potentially those most affected by carbon abatement policies, such as Iron and
steel (ORE), chemical products (CRP), non-ferrous metals (NFM), non-metallic minerals
(NMM), pulp and paper (PPP), and trade and transportation services (TRN).  The rest of
the economy is divided into agricultural production (AGR) and other goods (Y).
Primary factors include labor, capital, land and fossil-fuel resources.  Labor and
capital are treated as perfectly mobile across sectors within each region but internationally
immobile.  The production functions assumed in each sector allow sufficient levels of
                                                       
5 The primary source for base year (1992) economic statistics is Global Trade Analysis
Program  (GTAP; see McDougall, 1997), and our primary source for energy demand,7
nesting to permit substitution between primary energy types, as well as substitution
between a primary energy composite and secondary energy (electricity).
Figure 1 illustrates the nesting structure employed for production sectors other
than fossil fuels. Output is produced with fixed-coefficient (Leontief) inputs of
intermediate non-energy goods, and an energy-primary factor composite.  The energy
composite is in turn produced with a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function of
a primary-energy composite and electricity. The primary-energy composite is then a
function of coal, crude oil, refined oil and natural gas. The value-added composite consists
of a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of labor, capital and land.
Fossil fuel production is a nested-CES aggregate of an energy-specific resource
and a Leontief composite of labor input and the other goods in the model, where the
substitution elasticity between the specific factor and the composite is calibrated to match
an exogenous fossil fuel supply elasticity.  The supply elasticities used in the model are 2
for crude oil, 0.5 for coal, and 1 for natural gas. (Details on the calibration procedure are
provided in Appendix A.)
Table 1.  Countries, Regions, and Sectors in the General Equilibrium Model
Country or Region Commodities
AUS Australia  COL Coal
NZL New Zealand CRU Crude Oil
JPN Japan OIL Refined Oil Products
KOR Republic of Korea GAS Natural Gas
IDN Indonesia ELE Electricity
MYS Malaysia ORE
* Iron & Steel
                                                                                                                                                                    
supply and price data is the OECD/IEA publications for 1992.8
PHL Philippines CRP






* Pulp & Paper
HKG Hong Kong TRN
* Trade and Transport
TWN Taiwan AGR Agricultural Goods








RSM Rest of South America
E_U European Union 12
EU3 Austria, Finland, & Sweden
FSU Former Soviet Union
MEA Middle East & North Africa
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa
ROW Rest of  World
Final demand has the structure depicted in Figure 2. Utility in each country is a
nested-CES function of an energy consumption composite and a consumption composite
of the 12 non-energy goods in the model, where each of the two composites is in turn a
Cobb-Douglas aggregate.
6
CO2 emissions are associated with fossil fuel consumption in production and final
demand.  Different fuels have different carbon intensities.  The technology producing CO2,
then, is a fixed proportion activity in which each unit of  a fuel consumed emits a known
amount of carbon, i.e., the only feasible means of abatement, other than reducing
consumption, are inter-fuel and fuel-non fuel substitutions.
Figure 1.   Structure of non-Fossil Fuel Production
                                                       
6  The energy demand elasticities used in the model are consistent with those typically used in the





Non-energy intermediates  ESUB=0.25
   Cobb-Douglas
land, labor and capital Electricity




    Oil Natural Gas
ETA is a transformation elasticity,
ESUB and Sigma are substitution elasticities.
Figure 2.   Nesting Structure for Final Demand
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The model’s equilibrium framework is based on final demands for goods and
services in each region arising from a representative agent.  Final demands are subject to
an income balance constraint with fixed investment.  Consumption within each region is
financed from factor income, taxes and exogenously specified capital flows.  Taxes apply
to energy demand, factor income and international trade, and these finance a fixed level of
public provision.  The government budget is balanced through lump-sum taxes.
Energy goods and other commodities are traded in world markets.  Crude oil is
imported and exported as a homogeneous product, subject to tariffs and export taxes.  All
other goods, including energy products such as coal, electricity, and natural gas, are
characterized by product differentiation with an explicit representation of bilateral trade
flows calibrated to trade flows for the reference year, 1992.
Energy products (refined oil, coal, natural gas, and electricity) are sold at different
prices to industrial customers and final consumers.  The physical quantities of sectoral and
final energy demand are calibrated to the OECD/IEA Energy Balances and Statistics.  The
essential features of the model formulation are provided in Appendix B and the full mixed
complemenarity formulation (MCP) in Appendix C.
2.3    The Calibration of  CO2-Abatement Benefit Functions
Given the current state of knowledge on the greenhouse gas effect, there is no
obvious way of even characterizing the shape of the damage(benefit) function, Br.
Nevertheless, many in the profession seem to have assumed in their analysis that the
marginal abatement benefit is either constant or linear. (see, Hoel (1991), Nordhaus15
situation, neither the Former Soviet Union nor the East European countries are likely to
join the rest in Annex1 to meet these responsibilities.  Then it is primarily the OECD
regions who should honor these obligations.   The proposals launched at the Berlin
Mandate (1995), on the other hand, call for 10 to 20% reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions in the industrialized countries from their 1990 levels by year 2010.  Since CO2 is
the major anthropogenic greenhouse gas, any short term abatement action will naturally to
focus on fossil fuel use.  According to the 1992 projections of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), fossil fuel CO2-emissions are likely to grow by 2.5-3.5%
annually in the business-as-usual trajectories.  Given these projections along with the
objectives in FCCC and Berlin Mandate, a 10-15% one time reduction in global CO2-
emissions from their 1992 level, seems to be a good approximation of a moderate climate
policy within a static framework.  From the IEA 1992 Statistics, a 25% reduction in
OECD emissions amounts to a 12% reduction in global emissions.  Therefore, we adopt a
25% reduction target in the OECD for the analysis in the paper
8.
The 7 OECD regions in the original data set are aggregated into 5 regions: AUS
Australia and New Zealand, JPN Japan, CAN Canada, USA United States, and E_U
European Union(12) plus EU3.  The observed 1992 fossil fuel CO2-emissions in OECD
are assumed to characterize a Nash equilibrium, i.e., all feasible no regret energy savings
have been exhausted. Regarding implementation and coordination issues, both the FCCC
and Berlin Mandate seem to have endorsed economic efficiency, equity, gradual action,
and wider coalition as appropriate climate policy responses.  Efficiency, equity, and cost
sharing issues among the OECD regions are addressed through institution and quota
                                                       
8 However some preliminary sensitivity analyses have shown that the main insights of the paper are not16
allocation rule scenarios.  Two types of institutional arrangements are simulated: A
uniform OECD permit market and regional permit markets.
9 Four rules for allocating CO2
emission rights are experimented: The first emphasizes the status quo (Grandfathering)
and the other three emphasize equity, efficiency, and per-capita cost sharing.
3.2   Institutions, Quota Rules, and Welfare Impacts
        in a Unilateral OECD Abatement Coalition: Simulation Results
Table 2 presents a summary of the simulation results on institutions and quota
allocation rules.  The grandfathering rule, columns (1) and (2), allocates members' quotas
in proportion to their 1992 CO2-emissions (this is equivalent to each OECD region
                                                                                                                                                                    
affected by the size of the target.
9 Following the arguments in Schelling (1992) of the political implausibility of an international carbon
tax, a uniform OECD carbon tax is not considered in the analysis.17
cutting its emissions by 25%); the equity rule, column (3), allocates the members' quotas
in proportion to their 1992 populations; the efficiency rule, column (4), allocates the
members' quotas in proportion to their 1992 CO2-intensities per unit of their
corresponding per-capita GDPs; and the cost sharing rule, column (5), assigns members'
Table 2.  Quota Allocation Rules, Institutions, and the






































AUS -1.5 150 0.9 2.9 -0.7 72 0.5 2.9 2.9 -0.5 50 0.3 3.4
JPN -0.7 115 0.4 11.5 -0.7 112 0.4 -3.5 17.3 1.7 -278 -0.9 38.0
CAN -1.4 168 0.8 4.3 -1.3 156 0.8 1.8 4.0 -2.3 276 1.4 -0.5
USA -1.1 161 0.7 48.0 -0.9 142 0.6 15.1 35.6 -3.6 554 2.4 -74.5
E_U -1.1 172 0.7 33.3 -1.0 163 0.6 -16.3 40.2 0.2 -29 -0.1 33.6
OECD -1.0 157 0.6 100 -0.9 144 0.57 0 100 -1.0 150 0.6 0
a  leakage 12.5%, net global CO2 abatement 10.4%
b  leakage 11.5%, net global CO2 abatement 10.6%
c  leakage 11.7%, net global CO2 abatement 10.5%
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AUS 1.7 -5.3 527 3.3 -4.6 2.7 -1.5 144 0.8 2.4
JPN 27.6 5.6 -935 -3.2 108.2 11.1 -0.9 144 0.5 -6.8
CAN 2.6 -5.7 674 3.4 -10.3 4.4 -1.2 144 0.7 2.3
USA 22.1 -6.5 1000 4.3 -165.8 47.9 -0.9 144 0.6 13.7
E_U 46.0 1.2 -186 -0.7 72.5 33.9 -0.9 144 0.5 -11.6
OECD 100 -1.1 162 0.65 0 100 -0.9 144 0.57 0
d  leakage 11.8%, net global CO2 abatement 10.5%
e  leakage 11.5%, net global CO2 abatement 10.6%18
quotas in such a way that per-capita welfare costs (in dollars) are equated across the
coalition members.  The welfare costs are expressed in three forms: the percentage change
in the Hicksian index, EV%, the per-capita consumption reduction in dollars, and the
regional forgone consumption as a percent of the 1992 regional GDP
10.  Along with these,
Table 2 also reports trade flows in CO2-permit market for the different allocation rules.  In
terms of institution design, the results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the movement
into a uniform permit market is a Pareto-improvement for every member (assuming away
transaction costs.)  This improvement is a result of both the lower abatement cost and the
lower leakage rate (the increase in CO2-emissions by non-abating countries as a
percentage of the coalition abatement) associated with the uniform permit arrangement.
However, even though every member benefits from the coordination provided by the
uniform market, some regions (e.g. AUS) appear to benefit more than others because of
their lower abatement costs.
With respect to quota rules, both the equity and the efficiency criteria  result in
higher emission quotas for JPN and E_U, and lower ones for AUS, CAN, and USA
compared to those assigned by the grandfathering rule.  This is because both JPN and E_U
are relatively more energy efficient and relatively more populated than their other OECD
partners.  The welfare impacts for these two rules are shown respectively in columns (3)
and (4).  It is clear from the statistics that JPN and E_U are net gainers, whereas AUS,
                                                       
10 To check how close our 25% OECD cut approximates the effect of the FCCC and Berlin Mandate: for a
grandfathering scenario in which the FCCC global target is wholly met by OECD through a uniform tax,
the simulations of the OECD GREEN model suggest that the OECD average real income loss over the
period 1990-2050 is 0.76% relative to the business as usual baseline.  In contrast, the results on Table 2
(for the grandfathering with uniform permit) indicate an OECD loss of 0.57% of the 1992 GDP.19
CAN, and USA appear to experience huge welfare losses.  Not only that, but the overall
OECD welfare, measured by a base- year-consumption weighted Hicksian index, is lower
and the leakage rate is higher for either of these two rules when compared to the
corresponding results from the grandfathering rule.  Based on these results, an OECD
CO2-coalition with quotas allocated according to either a pure equity criterion or a pure
efficiency criterion is unlikely.  The last rule simulated in the analysis is the per-capita cost-
sharing allocation. The simulation results for this allocation are displayed on column (5).
The corresponding quotas implied by this rule suggest a minor reallocation of the
grandfathering quotas from the relatively low welfare cost members (AUS,JPN, and USA)
to the relatively high welfare cost ones (CAN and E_U).  In terms of the overall
performance (i.e. OECD welfare and leakage rate), the results for this allocation are
identical to those of the grandfathering allocation i.e. the two allocations seem to lie on the
same OECD Pareto-frontier.
The main insights from the exercises on Table 2 are therefore: (i) A uniform permit
market is better than regional permits or tax arrangements; (ii) quota allocation rules that
favor efficiency or equity criteria are unlikely; (iii) irrespective of the institution type or the
quota rule, there are likely to be sharp differences in the welfare impacts of the abatement
policy across the OECD regions.
To provide insights on the curvature of the marginal abatement costs and to
motivate the game analyses in the following sections, we have computed the uniform
permit price and the regional per-capita welfare costs for several reduction targets in the
range 0 to 40%. The implied elasticities suggest that the marginal abatement cost curves
are quite steep.  The CO2-abatement elasticity with respect to the coalition permit price is20
found to range between 0.04 and 0.13, and that with respect to the regional per-capita
welfare costs is found to range between 0.01 and 0.15.  The presence of such steep
marginal abatement costs implies free riding incentives are likely to be huge and
consequently the chances for a self-enforcing OECD abatement coalition are small.
4 The One-Shot Game Analysis and the Stability of an OECD Carbon Coalition
4.1 Benefit Estimates and Payoffs
Following the discussion in section 2, the marginal benefit estimates corresponding
to W0, W1, and W2 are used for calibrating the OECD payoffs.  For the grandfathering
with uniform permit scenario, W0 corresponds to a 5% markup on the regional per-capita
welfare costs shown for the scenario on Table 2, whereas W1 corresponds to the
linearized version of a 1% markup on the highest regional per-capita welfare cost shown
for the scenario on the same table (namely that of E_U).  The regional total benefits from
the cutback implied by these estimates lie in the range 0.4%-0.9% of the corresponding
1992 regional GDPs.  On the other hand, the per-capita marginal valuations corresponding
to the simulated Lindahl equilibrium (W2) are computed to be $352 for AUS, $279 for
JPN, $327 for CAN, $463 for USA, and $271 for E_U.  In 1992 GDP terms, the
corresponding regional benefits in the Lindahl provision of the 25% cutback are 2.2% for
AUS, 0.9% for JPN, 1.7% for CAN, 2.0% for USA, and 1.0% for E_U.
11  To express the
                                                       
11 An interesting insight from the simulated Lindahl equilibrium is the equality of the relative marginal
valuations of  the abatement provision and the private consumption composite across OECD regions.
This  imply that the marginal welfare costs in the no-public good case are equated across the coalition
members, which in a sense a reinterpretation of the burden sharing arrangement in Harrison and
Rutherford (1997).21
per-capita benefit estimates in per-billion tons of CO2 terms, we divide by the coalition net
abatement (i.e. abatement - leakage).
4.2 Equilibria in the One-Shot OECD-Coalition Game
The one-shot OECD interaction is a complete-information simultaneous move
game in which each region has two strategies: C cooperate (i.e. comply with the
abatement agreement), and N not-cooperate (i.e. not comply with the agreement).  All
players (i.e. OECD regions) are rational (i.e. welfare maximizers), and for every player:
both the other players’ strategies and the game payoffs are known.  The simulated payoffs
for the game constructs with grandfathering+permit scenario are reported on Table 3,
where players are labeled A for AUS, J for JPN, D for CAN, U for USA, and E for E_U,
payoffs correspond to players on the column, and where W0, W1, and W2 correspond to
the benefit estimates used in calibrating the payoffs.
Table 3.  OECD-Coalition Game Payoffs (b$)
Scenario: Grandfathering+ OECD Permit Market
column player      A                  J
row players     JDUE          ADUE
strat-        C        N                       C     N
egy
        W0   W1   W2    W0   W1   W2      W0    W1    W2    W0     W1   W2
 
CCCC    0.1  2.3  5.0  -0.0  2.2  4.8     0.7   8.9  17.0   20.2  27.6  34.3
NCCC    0.3  2.3  4.6   0.4  2.3  4.5   -0.2   7.8  15.5   19.2  26.4  32.8
CNCC    0.1  2.2  4.8  -0.1  2.0  4.5   -0.4   7.5  15.1   19.0  26.1  32.3
CCNC    0.3  1.4  2.6  -0.9  0.2  1.2   -8.9  -4.6  -1.5   11.5  14.8  17.1
CCCN   -0.2  1.4  3.1   0.3  1.8  3.5   -7.1  -1.2   3.6   10.5  15.6  19.5
NNCC    0.3  2.2  4.3   0.3  2.1  4.2   -1.4   6.4  13.6   18.0  24.9  30.8
NCNC    0.6  1.5  2.3  -0.5  0.3  1.1   -9.8  -5.7  -2.9   10.7  13.8  15.8
NCCN   -0.0  1.3  2.7   0.7  1.9  3.3   -7.9  -2.1   2.5    9.5  14.4  18.0
CNNC    0.6  1.6  2.7  -1.0 -0.1  0.9   -9.8  -5.7  -2.8   10.8  13.8  15.8
CNCN   -0.2  1.3  2.9   0.3  1.7  3.2   -7.9  -2.3   2.2    9.4  14.1  17.6
CCNN   -0.5 -0.0  0.4  -0.4 -0.0  0.3       -16.1 -14.5 -13.4    1.7   2.4   2.8
NNNC    1.0  1.8  2.5  -0.5  0.2  0.8       -10.8  -7.2  -4.7   10.0  12.8  14.6
NNCN   -0.1  1.2  2.5   0.6  1.8  3.0        -9.0  -3.6   0.6    8.6  13.2  16.6
NCNN   -1.0 -0.8 -0.7   0.0  0.1  0.2       -17.8 -16.5 -15.7    0.8   1.2   1.3
CNNN   -0.1  0.2  0.5  -0.4 -0.2  0.0       -17.5 -16.2 -15.4    0.9   1.2   1.4
NNNN   -1.2 -1.0 -1.1   0    0      0       -19.5 -18.5 -17.9      0     0     0
key:
players: A AUS, J JPN, D CAN, U USA, and E E_U.
Strategies: C cooperate, N not-cooperate; payoffs correspond to column players22
Table 3. continued..
column player      D                  U
row players     AJUE          AJDE
strat-        C        N                       C     N
egy
        W0   W1   W2    W0   W1   W2      W0    W1    W2    W0     W1   W2
 
CCCC    0.2  0.8  3.8  2.8  3.3  6.2     1.8  10.6  69.1   13.5  18.7  44.3
NCCC    0.1  0.7  3.6  2.6  3.1  5.9     1.0   9.7  66.1   11.9  16.8  40.6
CNCC   -0.2  0.4  3.0  2.4  2.9  5.3       -3.5   4.7  54.9    9.1  13.2  32.3
CCNC    0.5  0.9  2.2  1.8  2.1  3.3     1.0   9.6  65.0   12.8  17.7  41.4
CCCN   -1.4 -0.9  1.0  1.3  1.7  3.5     -10.0  -3.2  34.1    5.7   7.8  16.7
NNCC   -0.3  0.3  2.8  2.2  2.7  5.0      -4.3   3.7  52.0    7.6  11.3  28.5
NCNC    0.7  1.1  2.3  1.5  1.9  2.9       0.3   8.7  62.1   10.6  15.0  36.0
NCCN   -1.4 -1.0  0.9  1.1  1.5  3.2     -10.4  -3.7  32.6    4.3   6.0  13.2
CNNC    0.2  0.5  1.5  1.5  1.8  2.6       -4.4   3.5  50.8    8.4  12.1  29.3
CNCN   -1.6 -1.2  0.4  1.0  1.4  2.8     -14.0  -7.9  23.5    2.1   2.9   6.5
CCNN   -1.6 -1.5 -1.1  0.4  0.5  0.8     -10.4  -3.8  31.5    5.0   6.7  13.9
NNNC    0.5  0.8  1.7  1.3  1.6  2.3       -5.1   2.6  47.9    6.8  10.2  25.5
NNCN   -1.7 -1.3  0.2  0.9  1.3  2.7     -15.1  -9.3  20.2    0.7   1.2   2.9
NCNN   -1.4 -1.3 -0.9  0.2  0.3  0.5     -11.4  -5.0  28.3    3.7   5.0  10.3
CNNN   -2.3 -2.2 -2.0  0.1  0.2  0.3     -15.1  -9.5  19.1    1.3   1.7   3.5
NNNN   -2.4 -2.3 -2.2  0      0    0     -15.6 -10.1  17.5      0     0     0
Table 3. Continued.
column player    E
row players           AJDU
strat-     C      N
egy
  W0  W1     W2    W0    W1    W2
CCCC      2.3   5.8  22.3   35.4  38.9  48.5
NCCC      0.1   3.6  19.4   34.2  37.6  47.0
CNCC     -4.9  -1.3  12.5   28.6  31.9  39.8
CCNC      0.1   3.7  19.1   33.6  37.0  46.0
CCCN    -25.5 -22.6 -16.3   10.4  11.7  13.6
NNCC     -7.2  -3.6   9.5   26.6  29.8  37.1
NCNC     -2.1   1.5  16.2   31.5  34.9  43.3
NCCN    -27.7 -24.9 -19.2    8.4   9.5  11.0
CNNC     -7.1  -3.5   9.3   26.0  29.1  36.2
CNCN    -32.2 -29.8 -25.4    3.7   4.2   5.0
CCNN    -26.7 -23.9 -18.2    8.8   9.8  11.4
NNNC     -9.4  -5.8   6.3   24.8  27.9  34.7
NNCN    -34.6 -32.4 -28.4    1.7   2.0   2.4
NCNN    -29.5 -26.9 -21.9    6.9   7.7   8.9
CNNN    -33.6 -31.3 -27.3    1.9   2.2   2.6
NNNN    -35.5 -33.5 -29.9     0     0      0
Note that the strategies for the row players are ordered in accordance with the
ordering of the players, e.g., strategies NCNC and row players JDUE means J plays N, D
plays C, U plays N, and E plays C.
Since by construction the values of W0 and W1 that correspond to the full-
cooperation entries are predetermined, one can infer nothing about the actual benefit from23
full-cooperation on their basis.  On the other hand, if one is willing to accept the optimality
of 25% OECD abatement and the separability assumption employed in simulating the
Lindahl equilibrium, one can infer from the entries corresponding to W2 that the benefits
from full-cooperation to OECD regions are considerable.  Nevertheless, relative to
whatever benchmarking is used for the full-cooperation configuration, the rest of the
entries are valid payoffs for assessing the regional incentives for cooperation and
defection.
For the W0 and W1 games, except for AUS, the net benefit from not-cooperating
for each of the OECD regions, given that the other four regions cooperate, is greater than
the corresponding net benefit from cooperating.  This also true for JPN, CAN, and E_U in
the game corresponding to W2.  Hence, by the definition of Nash equilibrium, full-
cooperation is certainly not an equilibrium in either of the three games, and accordingly
none of these games is a coordination one.  Next, by looking at the individual region
payoff columns that correspond to its strategies C and N, we see in the W0 and W1 games
that the payoffs from N strictly exceed those from C for all regions except AUS.  But by
the concept of iterative dominance, the relevant payoffs facing AUS would then be -1.2,-
1.1 for C, and 0,0 for N.  Then the only equilibria for the W0 and the W1 games are the
iteratively dominant non-cooperation outcomes.  In other words, technically, the games
corresponding to W0 and W1 belong to the Prisoner's dilemma class.  By applying similar
analysis to the W2 game, we see that cooperation is a dominant strategy for USA,
whereas non-cooperation is the dominant strategy for JPN, CAN, and E_U.  Yet, by the
concept of iterative dominance AUS would then be facing the payoff of 2.5 from her C
strategy and 3 from her N strategy.  Therefore, the unique equilibrium of this game is the24
iterative dominance outcomes of cooperation for USA and defection for all others, i.e.,
according to this game, we should expect a unilateral USA leadership.
12  To rank this
outcome relative to the full-cooperation one, the payoffs indicate that each region, except
E_U, strictly prefers the full-cooperation outcome.  Nevertheless, by invoking the Kaldor
criterion, the sum of the net benefits from the move to full-cooperation for the benefiting
regions exceeds the E_U's loss from the move by 42.7 billion dollars.
With respect to the feasibility of a stable (or a self-enforcing) sub-coalition, the
preceding analysis suggests the prompt answer that the maximum size of such a sub-
coalition is zero for the W0 and W1 games and 1 for W2 game.  Alternatively, one may
ask the weaker version:  Whether smaller beneficial sub-coalitions are feasible, and what is
the size of the smallest such sub-coalition?
13  By verifying that the sub-coalition must be
beneficial for every member, the smallest size that support such a sub-coalition is 5 for the
W0-game (i.e. the minimum beneficial size is full cooperation), 3 for the W1-game
(namely JPN, USA, and E_U), and 1 for the W2-game.  Ignoring the W2 case, this
suggests that a beneficial OECD sub-coalition must include at least JPN, USA, and E_U.
 A final piece of inference on the payoffs in Table 3 is the observation that
defection incentives among the big OECD members (i.e. JPN, USA, and E_U) appear to
be pairwise uncorrelated.  This is important for the later repeated game analysis, because it
precludes the possibility of effective coalitions among defectors.
                                                       
12 For the 50%-cutback benefit calibration in Piggott et al, their results suggest that both of E_U and
North America have incentive to lead a 25% cutback (nevertheless, in their context, such a leadership may
not be supported in an equilibrium i.e. may not be a best response.)
13 In Piggott et al's language, these are the smallest coalitions for which the 25%-cut is a consensus
emission reduction.25
Given the discussed outcomes of the games corresponding to the grandfathering +
permit scenario, the natural question is whether these outcomes depend on the assumed
institution type and the quota allocation rule.  Of particular interest is whether the
Prisoner's dilemma outcomes of W0 and the W1 games would be modified by changing
the institution type and/or the quota allocation rule.  In pursuing answers to these
questions, payoffs were simulated for the equal per-capita cost allocation with uniform
permit market and for the grandfathering allocation with regional permit markets.
Furthermore, to allow for the effect of the benefit method,  W0 is used for the former and
W1 for the latter.  The resulting payoff matrices are shown on Table D1 and Table D2 in
Appendix D.  Not surprisingly, by the same iterative dominance method, the unique
equilibria of these two games are also the mutual non-cooperation strategies.
The other question is whether the mutual defection outcomes are in fact the by-
product of the low abatement benefits assumed in calibrating W0 and W1.  To show that
these outcomes are robust with respect to the size of the regional benefits from abatement,
we have simulated payoffs and computed the one-shot game equilibria for per-capita
benefit estimates that correspond to 50% and 100% markups on the regional per-capita
welfare costs.  The benefit estimates and the equilibrium strategies in these two games,
along with those in the W0-game, are shown on Table 4.
The results on Table(4) are self-explanatory and clearly underscore the robustness
of the mutual defection equilibrium in the one-shot OECD coalition game.
To sum up, the likely equilibrium of the OECD one shot coalition game seems to
be the unavoidable Prisoner's dilemma mutual defection outcome.  Under the current26
Table 4.   The OECD One-Shot Game: Sensitivity to the Benefit Estimates
 
        5% Net-benefit(i.e.W0)        50% Net-benefit           100% Net-benefit
          Gross Benefit      Equ.      Gross Benefit    Equ.      Gross Benefit     Equ
                             Stra                       Stra                        Stra
          per-capita  gdp    tegy     per-capita  gdp   tegy      per-capita gdp    tegy
region        ($)     (%)                ($)     (%)                 ($)     (%)
AUS      75.6     0.53 N   108.0    0.75     N 144.0    1.0    N
JPN     117.6     0.42 N   168.0    0.60     N 244.0    0.8      N
CAN     163.8     0.84 N   234.0    1.20     N 302.0    1.6    N
USA     149.1     0.63 N   213.0    0.90     N 284.0    1.2      C
E_U     171.2     0.63 N   244.5    0.90     N 326.0    1.2      N
Key:
Strategy:   C Cooperate, N Not-cooperate;    Scenario:   Grandfathering+permit
institutional arrangements and in the absence of a regional sovereign institution that
enforces commitments, a stable and beneficial carbon coalition among OECD regions is,
therefore, unlikely.  In the next section we motivate and present a repeated trade-
environment framework, within which we show that a stable OECD coalition may be
achieved.
5.  Repeated Game Analysis: Trade-Environment Interface and
      Subgame-Perfection of the OECD CO2-Coalition
In this section we first present the infinitely repeated OECD coalition game and
show that full-cooperation in such context is unlikely to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome.  Next, we motivate the connected trade-environment framework and present
two constructs: The first is an infinitely repeated trade-CO2 interconnected game and the
second is a finitely repeated one. In the first construct, we show that cooperation in the
full OECD coalition can be an equilibrium outcome if trade is included in the game.  In the
second, we show that cooperation in the full OECD coalition can also be supported as an
equilibrium outcome in the finite horizon and for relatively impatient players if suitable
trade instruments are designed.28
AUS 0.1  0.0 0 SE
JPN 0.7 20.2 0 0.97
CAN 0.2  2.8 0 0.93
USA 1.8 13.5 0 0.87
E_U 2.3 35.4 0 0.94
Key:
SE:    cooperation is self-enforcing(best response).
Scenario: W0 with grandfathering+permit.
5.2 The Repeated Trade-Environment Connected Framework
5.2.1 Motivation
The presence of global trade interaction and the subtleties of the global trade-
environment interface
15 avail the players additional incentives to coordinate their actions as
well as instruments to commit themselves to cooperation.  The sub-optimality of the
present global trading system
16, the additional distortions injected by the presence of CO2
taxes, and their associated repercussions on competitiveness of energy-based industries
and international trade flows reinforce the need for further coordination of trade policies
among the colluding parties.  On the other hand, to set a "level playing field", players may
be willing to take countervailing trade measures against defectors to limit the scope for
environment trade-leakage and to punish free riding.
Motivated by the need of OECD regions to jointly coordinate their environmental
actions with their trade policies, we think of a trade-CO2 interconnected setup in which
OECD regions negotiate a 25% reduction of tariffs on energy intensive imports along with
the 25% CO2-cutback.  Within this setup, by pooling the players' environment and trade
                                                       
15 A detailed exposition on global warming - trade interface and the scope for an environment-based
countervailing trade measures is provided in Whalley(1991) and Babiker, Maskus, and Rutherford(1997).
16 The recent Uruguay reforms are primarily meant to address this issue; nonetheless, they do not exhaust
the room for further beneficial trade coordination.29
incentives in one game, outcomes better than those in the isolated environment game may
be achievable (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1990.)
Alternatively, we may think of a double-instruments trade strategy being added to
the original CO2-game in such a way that during the punishment regime cooperation is
rewarded by reduction of trade barriers and defection is punished by countervailing trade
measures.  Within such a context, our objective would be to characterize the extent of
rewards and punishments needed to subgame-perfect the coalition in a finite number of
trade-environment repeated interactions.
We consider these two constructs in turn:
5.2.2 The Infinitely Repeated OECD Trade-CO2 Interconnected Game
Suppose OECD regions agree to play the W0-game on Table 3, in which each
region has the strategies {C,N}, jointly with a simultaneous move trade game, in which
each OECD region has the strategies {L,H}.  L says lower tariffs on energy intensive
imports by 25% and H says not lower them.  The one-shot trade-CO2 inter-connected
game is then a simultaneous move game in which each OECD region has the strategies
{CL, CH, NL, NH}, where in the status quo NH is being played by all regions.
Now, suppose this static interconnected game is to be repeated infinitely with
outcomes from all previous t-1 periods observed before the beginning of period t.  Next,
for each OECD region, consider the trigger strategy:
Play CL in the first period. In period t, play CL if every OECD region has played CL in each of
the t-1 previous periods; otherwise, play NH.
The regional minimum discount factors for which this trigger strategy constitutes a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated trade-CO2 game together with
the regional payoffs from full-cooperation, unilateral defection, and mutual defection are30
reported on Table 6.  Where full cooperation means every region playing CL, mutual
defection means every region playing NH, and where the payoffs for unilateral defection
are the maximum payoffs from unilaterally defecting in either or both the trade and the
environment.
Table 6.  Subgame-Perfection in the Infinitely Repeated OECD Trade-CO2Game
            Payoffs(b$) Minimum
Discount
Region Full     Unilateral Mutual Factor
    Cooperation   Defection    Defections [dr]
AUS        1.2  1.1 0 SE
JPN       24.7 20.0 0 SE
CAN        0.5  2.3 0 0.78
USA        6.0 17.4 0 0.66
E_U        7.9 35.3 0 0.78
Key:
SE:    cooperation is self-enforcing(best response).
Scenario: W0 with grandfathering+permit.
  It is obvious that the minimum regional discount factors on Table 6 are on average
20% lower than those on Table 5.  In particular, with the presence of trade coordination,
Table 6 shows that environmental compliance is a best response for both AUS and JPN.
Hence, this suggests that stronger subgame-perfection of the OECD carbon abatement
coalition is achievable if trade coordination is invoked within the game.
5.2.3 The Finitely Repeated OECD Trade-CO2 Connected Game
  Suppose the OECD regions agree to condition the play of the original W0-game
on a simultaneous move trade game, in which each region has the strategies {R,S,P};
where R says reduce tariffs on energy intensive imports by a given %, S says play the
status quo tariffs, and P says play a given hard (punishment) tariff.  We interpret the
punishment tariff to be a countervailing tariff on the CO2 content of the defecting region
exports to the given region.31
Define the finitely repeated trade-CO2 game construct as one in which the W0-
game and the trade game are played simultaneously in each stage with the outcomes of the
previous stage being observed before the beginning of the current stage.  Let T be the
number of stages in the repeated game.  Within this construct, our interest is to
characterize a subgame-perfect outcome in which cooperation on the CO2-abatement is
played by every OECD region in each stage of the game.
Assume T is sufficiently large, and consider each OECD region adopting the
following "3-instruments" strategy:
Play C and S in the first stage.  From the second stage on, play C and S if every region has
played C and S in all the previous stages; otherwise, in addition to playing C, play R with those who have
played C and S in all previous stages and play P with those who haven't.
     
Notice the two special properties of this strategy: (i) The trade instruments R and
P are to be played only when environmental defection is observed, i.e. they are essentially
enforcement mechanisms. (ii) The mutual environmental defection is not invoked during
the punishment regime, i.e., it avoids the implausible threat that every one defects.
Depending on our earlier observation that an effective coalition among the
defectors is unlikely, only the cases of unilateral defections are considered. Our objective
is, then, to determine for each OECD region the size of the trade instruments associated
with R and P, and the horizon length such that playing the preceding strategy by every
region constitutes a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game.
The countervailing tariff used in the numerical simulations is an endogenous tax on
the CO2-content of the defecting region exports to the remaining regions in the coalition.
In turn, the carbon content is measured by the per-dollar CO2 coefficients from the inverse
input-output carbon computation, the details of which are described in Rutherford and32
Babiker (1997).  We use a 10% discount rate for computing the regional horizon length.
The simulation results for this exercise are summarized on Table 7.
Column (1) displays the percentage change in the defecting region's energy
intensive exports (relative to their full-cooperation level) to the colluding regions.  These
are essentially the trade-leakage gains from free riding.  As is apparent from "Def" entry,
in the absence of punishment, these gains are considerable.  In contrast, with the
countervailing carbon tariff, these free rider gains are turned into losses (entry "Pun").
Nevertheless, for a large region such as E_U, the credibility of the punishment may call for
a complete ban on its EIS exports to the coalition regions.
Table 7.  Subgame-Perfection of  OECD Coalition in the repeated  Trade-CO2 Game
            (1)          (2)                       (3)
Def    %change in EIS    Defector's Payoff         Punishment regime
reg-       exports              (b$)
ion      btax   tariff  yr
   Def    Pun         Def   Cop   Pun                 red(%)
AUS      75     -70         0.0   0.1  -0.9            1      10     1
JPN       7     -66      20.2   0.7  -2.9            2      50    11
CAN      33     -31         2.8   0.2  -7.8            1      25     2
USA      34     -65       13.5   1.8 -15.9            1      75     2
E_U      12     -99       35.4   2.3  -2.1            6      90    20
key:  EIS      Energy intensive goods,
      Def      Unilateral defection regime,
      Cop      Cooperation regime,
      Pun      Cooperating and punishing the defector regime,
      btax      Border CO2 tax as a multiple of the coalition permit price,
      tariff red  % removal of tariff on EIS imports among colluding members,
      yr      the required length of the region horizon
Scenario:   Grandfathering+permit, Benefit method W0
Column (2) reports for each region the payoffs from unilateral defection without
punishment, full-cooperation, and unilateral defection with punishment.  For full-
cooperation to be subgame-perfect, the present value of the payoffs from cooperation for
each member must be at least as high as that from unilateral defection followed by the33
punishment.  For a 10% discount rate, entry "yr" of column (3) shows the region's
minimum horizon needed to satisfy subgame-perfection of full-cooperation. As evident
from the table, these horizons range from as low as 1 year for AUS to as high as 20 years
for E_U, suggesting that, given the punishment terms, a typical OECD decision maker,
with a 20-years planning horizon and who uses a 10% discount rate, would have no
incentive to free ride.  The "btax" entry in column (3) reports the per-ton border carbon
tax expressed as a multiple of the corresponding coalition permit price.  With exception to
JPN and E_U, the results imply that an equal-foot treatment on trans-boundary carbon is a
sufficient deterrent to free riding. The needed tariff reductions among the remaining
parties in the coalition such that continuing cooperation and punishing the defector are
best responses for each one, are in turn shown under entry "tariff red(%)" on column (3).
The reported figures suggest that tariff reductions in the range 10-90% could be called for
if defection were to occur.
Summing up, the results on Table 7 suggest that full cooperation among OECD
regions can be fostered within the finite horizon for relatively impatient policy makers if
suitable trade reward and punishment instruments are designed, yet, the required reward
and punishment patterns may prove to be quite stringent as they might amount to a
complete ban on the imports from the defecting region
17.  Nevertheless, as we shall see in
the following section, by expanding the coalition to include some of the non OECD
regions, these requirements can be reduced significantly.
6.   The Expanded CO2-Abatement Coalition
                                                       
17 Note that if we were to disaggregate the E_U region, these requirements could be quite reduced.  Yet it
is more plausible that the European countries will jointly coordinate their actions, and therefore it is more
defensible to treat them as one player in the carbon abatement game.34
The analysis in this section follows Carraro and Siniscalo(1993) analysis of
coalition expansion through self-financed transfers.  Specifically, we portray a scenario in
which OECD approaches other regions through take-or-leave offers to join the OECD
CO2-abatement coalition.  The offer specifies a given level of CO2-abatement in return for
a full access to the coalition permit market.  The additional CO2-abatement provided by
the new members is netted off against the OECD abatement obligation so that the global
reduction target remains the same.  The simulated offers are restricted to meet the
conditions in Carraro and Siniscalo study, namely:
(i) each OECD region must be at least as better off as without the entry of the last
new member.  This is made even more stronger by imposing the requirement that the
welfare cost (EV%) of each OECD region is not greater than without the additional
member.
(ii) with a zero marginal valuation for the environment provision, each new
member must be at least as well off as without joining the coalition.
(iii) in the case of sequential offers, each of the old non OECD members in the
coalition must be at least as well off by remaining in the coalition after the last entry as
by withdrawing from it.
To reduce the transaction costs associated with the expansion and to make the
coalition size manageable, a 5% minimum abatement rule is added to the preceding
requirements.  The simulation results of such an environment have revealed that
simultaneous or sequential offers of 10% for the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and 5% for
each of China (CHN) and India (IDI) exhaust the mutual benefits from a further expansion
of the coalition.  With such an expanded coalition the required OECD abatement to meet
the global target falls from 25% to 20%.  In addition, the leakage rate is found to fall from
11.5% to 2.9%, implying an increase in the actual (net) global abatement from 10.6% to35
11.3%.  A summary of the simulation results for the original and the expanded coalition is
provided on Table 8.
Table 8.  Self-Financed Expansion of the Carbon Coalition
           (1)    (2)      (3)
Region     OECD Coalition   The Expanded Coalition   EV% for Further
       Expansion by 5%
          EV%    W0  Ctrade   EV%    W0    Ctrade     Abatement Rule
         (b$)   (b$)    (b$)    (b$)
AUS      -0.7   0.1    2.9   -0.7    0.3   -0.3
JPN      -0.7   0.7   -3.5   -0.1   13.4   -2.9
CAN      -1.3   0.2    1.8   -0.5    3.2   -0.9
USA      -0.9   1.8   15.1   -0.4   26.5   -9.3
E_U      -1.0   2.3  -16.3   -0.3   40.8   -8.8
CHN      -0.5     0.1           9.4
IDI      -0.4     0.5           1.3
FSU      -0.1     1.0          11.5
KOR       0.4     0.4  0.1
IDN      -0.9    -0.4              -0.4
MYS       1.3     0.2              -0.6
PHL      -0.4    -0.1              -0.3
SGP      -2.2    -0.4              -0.4
THA      -0.9    -0.3              -0.4
HKG      -1.1    -0.2              -0.3
TWN       0.4     0.2               0.0
MEX      -0.6    -0.2              -0.3
ARG      -0.3    -0.1              -0.1
BRA      -0.0     0.1               0.0
CHL       0.7     0.2               0.2
RSM      -1.5    -0.5              -0.4
MEA      -3.3    -1.3 -1.3
SSA      -1.2    -0.5 -0.7
ROW      -0.4    -0.2
key:
Ctrade   CO2 trade,
EV%   % change in Hecksian welfare index
Scenario Grandfathering(OECD)+permit
Column (1) displays the original OECD coalition results, column (2) displays the
expanded coalition results, and column (3) reports the welfare gains for each of the other
regions from joining the expanded coalition.  A comparison of the entries on columns (1)
and (2) suggest the feasibility of huge welfare gains for the OECD regions from expanding
the coalition.  These welfare gains are essentially the result of the cheaper off shore
abatement option, the smaller cut backs needed to meet the target, and the lower36
leakage rate associated with the expanded coalition.  On the other hand, the new coalition
members (CHN, IDI, and FSU) are clearly better off with the self-financed scheme and
the opportunity to trade in the coalition permit market.  In effect, Table 8 marks a shift in
the CO2-trade from within the OECD to these new members, and indicates a total of 22
billion dollars for the latter from this trade.  In addition, all other regions, with exception
to those who benefit from the trade leakage, seem to realize considerable gains from the
coalition expansion.  In particular, the welfare costs in the oil exporting countries appear
to fall by more than 100% following the expansion of the coalition.  This later result is
mainly due to the restoration of the international oil market following the weakening of
the constraint on fossil fuel demand in OECD regions.  Accordingly, this may suggest a
willingness on the part of OPEC countries to finance even a further expansion of the
coalition.  Finally, column (3) shows that no other region stands to gain from joining the
coalition, which in turn completes the stability of the expanded coalition.
Thus, the analysis so far suggests that a beneficial, stable, and manageable self-
financed expansion of the CO2-coalition is feasible.  Nevertheless, the stability of such an
expanded coalition implicitly hinged upon the punishment and reward scheme that gave
the subgame-perfection attribute for the initial OECD coalition.  Therefore, we need to
characterize, in a similar way, a trade scheme of punishment and reward that supports the
subgame-perfection of the expanded coalition.  The analyses of such a scheme are
provided on Table 9, which shows the same entries on table 7 with the addition of 3 rows
and a column to accommodate the new coalition members.37
 Table 9.  Subgame-Perfection of the Expanded Coalition in the repeated Trade-CO2 Game
        (1)               (2)                     (3)
Def      Defector's Payoff        Non OECD Payoffs        Punishment regime
reg-         (b$)                     (b$)
ion            btax  tariff   yr
          Def   Cop   Pun         FSU   CHN   IDI              red(%)
AUS      1.6    0.3   -0.5        3.4   1.0   1.6          1     10     2
JPN     14.1   13.4   12.7        3.4   0.5   1.8          1     20     2
CAN      4.8    3.2    1.0        3.4   1.0   1.6          1     10     2
USA     24.3   26.5    NA    
E_U     37.9   40.8    NA    
FSU     -0.3    3.4    NA
CHN     -1.0    0.2    NA
IDI     -0.5    0.8    NA
key:  Def     Unilateral defection regime,
      Cop     Cooperation regime,
      Pun     Cooperating and punishing the defector regime,
      btax     Border CO2 tax as a multiple of the coalition permit price,
      tariff red % removal of tariff on EIS imports among colluding members,
      yr.     The required length of the region horizon,
      NA     Not applicable.
     Scenario: Grandfathering(OECD)+permit, Benefit method is W0
Note that for FSU, CHN, and IDI the computation of W0 assumes the marginal
benefit from abatement is zero.
Provided that all OECD regions have the same old marginal valuations, column (1)
suggests that the gaps between the full-cooperation outcomes and the unilateral defection
outcomes are now very much narrowed for almost all OECD regions. In particular, for
both USA and E_U, cooperation is now a self-enforcing strategy, i.e., a best response.
Furthermore, by the definition of the expanded coalition, cooperation is a best response
for each of the new coalition members and therefore is also self-enforcing for them.
On the other hand, for a 10% discount rate, column (3) indicates that a threat of a
border carbon tax at a rate equivalent to the coalition permit price is sufficient to elevate
full cooperation to a subgame perfect outcome within a horizon of  only two years.
Column (2) ensures that each of the new members is not worse off in the punishment
phase.  Finally, column (3) indicates that a 20% reduction in tariffs among the regions38
remaining in the coalition is sufficient to make cooperating and punishing the defector best
responses for them.  Thus, compared to the exclusively OECD coalition, the requirements
to foster full-cooperation in the expanded coalition appear to be quite trivial.
7.   Concluding Remarks
This paper has discussed some of the hot issues in the current global warming
policy debate such as the design of institutions, the allocation of the abatement
responsibilities, and the formation and the expansion of CO2-abatement coalitions.
Specifically, the paper attempted to place the game theoretic analysis on global warming
within an empirical context.
The empirical framework used in the paper is a static multi-region, multi-
commodity Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy.  With
respect to institutions design, the simulation results have endorsed the superiority of the
uniform permit arrangement, whereas with respect to allocation rules, grandfathering
appeared to be the most likely.  Nevertheless, irrespective of the institution type or the
quota rule and for different benefit estimates, the analysis of the simulated payoffs have
indicated that the unique outcome of the one-shot OECD abatement game is the status
quo of no action.  However, with repetition of the game, the simulation results showed
that full-cooperation among OECD regions can be supported as subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome and without invoking the implausible threat of mutual defections
provided that appropriate trade punishment and reward instruments are included in the
game.  Yet, the punishment in some extreme cases might call for a complete ban of energy
intensive imports from the defecting region.
The last part of the paper considered a self-financed scheme for expanding the43
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Model Definition:
The equilibrium model is defined by associating each zero_profit equation with a
dual activity level and each market clearing equation with a dual price level as follows:
Model MCP /PRF_Y.Y, PRF_M.M, PRF_A.A, PRF_YT.YT, PRF_C.C, PRF_G.G,
 PRF_OM.Oilm, PRF_OX.Oilx, DEF_PY.PY, DEF_PEV.PEV, MKT_PD.PD,
 MKT_PX.PX, MKT_PA.PA, MKT_PM.PM, MKT_PT.PT, MKT_PF.PF,
 MKT_PC.PC, MKT_PG.PG, MKT_Crude.Pcrude, MKT_PR.PR,
 CARB_DEF.CARB, MKT_PCRB.Pcarb, INC_RA.Income/
APPENDIX D: The One-Shot OECD Abatement Coalition Game:
 Sensitivity to Institution and Quota Rules
Table D1.   Payoffs Matrix for the OECD Cost-Sharing Game(b$)
column player       A     J           D          U           E
row players     JDUE    ADUE   AJUE         AJDE          AJDU
strategy   C     N       C    N       C    N       C     N       C     N
CCCC  0.2   1.5     0.9  23.8    0.2  2.4     1.8  13.8     2.1  31.6
NCCC  0.2   1.7    -0.4  22.7    0.0  2.2     0.2  12.3    -0.4  30.5
CNCC  0.1   1.3    -0.4  22.4   -0.4  2.1    -5.6   9.3    -6.2  25.4
CCNC -0.8  -0.2   -11.9  13.0    0.7  1.5     1.1  12.5     0.3  30.0
CCCN -0.3   1.3    -7.1  12.8   -1.0  1.1    -6.5   5.9   -22.1   9.4
NNCC  0.1   1.5    -1.7  21.3   -0.5  1.9    -7.2   7.7    -8.9  23.6
NCNC -0.7   0.0   -13.5  12.0    0.8  1.4    -0.4  10.9    -2.2  28.1
NCCN -0.2   1.5    -8.2  11.7   -1.1  0.9    -7.7   4.5   -25.1   7.6
CNNC -0.7  -0.4   -13.3  12.1   -0.0  1.4    -6.4   8.6    -8.1  23.1
CNCN -0.3   1.2    -7.9  11.5   -1.4  0.8   -13.0   2.1   -32.3   3.3
CCNN -1.1  -0.2   -16.6   2.0    0.1  0.3    -6.4   5.1   -23.2   8.0
NNNC -0.5  -0.1   -14.9  11.2    0.1  1.2    -8.0   6.9   -10.8  22.0
NNCN -0.3   1.4    -9.4  10.7   -1.6  0.7   -15.1   0.7   -36.1   1.5
NCNN -1.6   0.1   -19.2   1.0    0.3  0.1    -8.2   3.7   -26.1   6.3
CNNN -0.6  -0.3   -16.3   1.0   -1.6  0.1   -13.8   1.3   -33.5   1.7
NNNN -1.1   0     -19.1   0     -2.4  0     -15.3   0     -37.1   050
key:
players:    A AUS, J JPN, D CAN, U USA, and E E_U.
Strategies: C cooperate, N not cooperate.
Scenario:   permit market with quota allocated to equate per-capita costs across
            the participating regions.
Benefit:    W0
Table D2.   OECD-Coalition Game Payoffs (b$)
Scenario: Grandfathering with Regional Permit Markets.
column player       A     J           D          U          E
row players     JDUE    ADUE   AJUE          AJDE         AJDU
strategy   C     N       C    N       C    N       C     N       C     N
CCCC  0.5   1.8     7.4  27.3    0.2  3.2     3.4  16.4     0.5  36.7
NCCC  0.6   1.9     6.4  26.2    0.0  3.0     1.9  14.9    -1.3  35.5
CNCC  0.4   1.6     6.0  25.8   -0.2  2.7    -2.1  11.2    -7.6  29.4
CCNC -1.2  -0.0    -5.4  14.4   -0.8  1.8     1.9  14.7    -1.7  34.8
CCCN  0.3   1.6    -5.1  14.5   -1.3  1.5    -5.9   6.9   -25.0  10.8
NNCC  0.5   1.8     5.0  25.0   -0.3  2.6    -3.6   9.7    -9.4  27.4
NCNC -1.1   0.2    -6.3  13.2   -0.9  1.7     0.4  13.2    -3.5  32.8
NCCN  0.6   1.8    -5.7  13.4   -1.4  1.3    -6.6   5.4   -26.8   8.8
CNNC -1.4  -0.2    -6.7  12.9   -1.0  1.5    -3.6   9.6    -9.7  26.7
CNCN  0.2   1.4    -6.1  13.0   -1.5  1.2    -9.8   2.5   -32.0   3.7
CCNN -1.3  -0.1   -16.9   2.2   -2.0  0.4    -6.6   5.9   -27.1   9.0
NNNC -1.2   0.1    -7.7  12.1   -1.2  1.4    -4.3   8.8   -10.7  25.6
NNCN  0.4   1.7    -7.0  12.3   -1.6  1.1   -11.3   1.0   -33.8   1.8
NCNN -1.0   0.1   -17.8   1.1   -2.2  0.2    -8.1   4.4   -28.9   7.0
CNNN -1.4  -0.2   -17.8   1.1   -2.2  0.2   -11.4   1.5   -34.1   2.0
NNNN -1.1   0     -18.8   0     -2.3  0     -12.1   0     -35.1   0
key:
players:    A AUS, J JPN, D CAN, U USA, and E E_U.
Strategies: C cooperate, N not cooperate.
Benefit:    W1
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